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Broadfoot: The Archival Briar Patch

THE ARCHIVAL BRIAR PATCH
Winston Broadfoot*

Like an untrained bird dog, I shall run a few
legal rabbits through the archival briar patch. Thus my
remarks shall be at random, pointed and barbed perhaps as
we go. If we scare up a few rabbits, that's almost as
good as catching one.
I shall mention copyright, but not really talk
about it. Copyright is that protection which the Congress of the United States extends to those people who
publish their creative efforts. The law is designed to
prevent literary piracy, a kind of theft that once flourished when one publisher would print for his own profit
the works of another publisher. Under copyright law,
within certain limitations, this can be done only by the
payment of royalties.
The invention of the photo-duplicating machine has made every kid on the block a potential
publisher and pirate, but we won't go into that mess except to say for the past ten years Congress has been trying unsuccessfully to revise the 1909 Copyright Law. One
of the main problems is that of fitting the business of
photocopying into the doctrine of fair use of copyrighted
materials. Under court interpretation, fair use is the
little bit you get free, without violating the copyright
law. Anyhow, instead of copyright law, I will be talking
about manuscripts and some problems relating to these unpublished materials.
A manuscript is a chattel or an item of personal
property, if you will, and the first question I raise of
chattels is who owns them. Except for some specialized
chattels, like negotiable instruments in limited situations, you cannot own an item that has been stolen from
someone else. You might possess it, but you do not own
it, no matter how innocently you came by it nor how much

*Mr. Broadfoot, an attorney and the Director of
the Flowers Collection at Duke University, delivered this
talk at the Society's Workshop on Archives and Records in
Atlanta on Novmeber 17, 1973.
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paid, nor how long ago the theft occurred. The rightowner has only to prove his claim in order to recover
chattel without any reimbursement whatever to you. The
here is the same whether we speak of manuscripts, washmachines, rare books, jewelry, or junk.

Real property, as opposed to personal property, consists of various estates in land. Historically real property is transferred from one owner to another by an instrument describing the property. The instrument, known as a
deed, is then recorded as a public record. The execution
of the instrument in the form required by law is entirely
sufficient to effect the transfer of the property. The
purpose of the recording is to give public notice of ownership, thereby making ineffective any subsequent recording
by another party purporting to claim the same property .
From these requirements, both as to the deed and the recording, you can readily see that one does not steal land
as readily as one steals a refrigerator. However, to complicate this issue just a little bit for your benefit, there
is such a thing as adverse possession whereby a stranger
to your title may own your property after a number of
years of active possession that is openly hostile to your
interests. So we see that there can be a kind of theft of
real estate which, though it takes several years to bring
off, is ultimately sanctioned under the concept of adverse
possession.
To this law of theft as it applies to personal
property and real property, I now add the caveat that I am
talking only about ordinary mortals. Kings were once
above the law, even as now and then a president tries to be.
The rule was that adverse possession never ran against the
Crown. This doctrine still applies to real property owned
by any government or sub-division thereof. For example,
you can fence off a piece of federal or state park and
build a house on it and live there forever, claiming the
land however you will, and you will never own that land.
Of course practical problems arise as to a theft
of chattels that has been committed in the distant past.
When people who originally owned the property have died,
a difficulty exists in establishing that the theft occurred
and in locating the lawful heir to the property. Particularly you can see this is true when we are talking about
ordinary personal property with no special identifying
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marks. Even when we are talking about letters where the
author and the original recipient are certain, the fact
that such manuscripts are later in someone else's possession is not any evidence of theft. Witness today's thriving manuscript market which is in no way a thieves' market.
An individual owner can sell, give away, or discard whatever manuscripts he possesses. Such transfers
are common and they make a particular transfer by theft
hard to spot. For all that, let me say again that the
manuscript thief gains no title nor does any person in
the chain of possession from the thief have title.

Do the same rules apply to manuscripts belonging
to the State as to the manuscripts of an individual? This
is what is called an interesting question, but first a
footnote: Manuscripts of presidents of the United States
are today considered their personal property. Presidents
have raised money and established libraries in places of
their choosing, thereafter obtaining public funds trr support these personal monuments. Yet the typewriters, the
secretarial time, the materials, the office overhead, and
all costs whatever in the production of these documents
come from the public purse. I see no way these materials
can be considered private property, unless we revert to
the concept of the royal privilege, which is a cut above
executive privilege.
Mr. Nixon donated his vice-presidential papers
to the National Archives and received approximately onehalf million dollars of tax benefit. That tax loophole
has now been closed but a question remains: If a vicepresident's papers are his to donate, albeit now without
a tax benefit, might he not sell the papers? Better yet,
does a president have the right to destroy his papers?
End of footnote.
Most problems of ownership are less complicated
when one considers state documents. The dispersal of
state documents happens less often than that of private
papers. Recent state archives laws make ordinary disposal
illegal. This leaves us with problems arising from earlier
days. What about abandonment--for example, a court house
was renovated and in the process public r e cords were dumped in the trash. Have not these papers been abandoned and
therefore do they not legally belong to whomever rescues
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them from the trash? Certainly this would be the case
with private papers. Many states, take the position that
there can be no abandonment of public property. As the
State Archivist of Virginia wrote to me in 1960:
Insofar as public records of Virginia
are concerned, it has been the policy
of the Virginia State Library to deny
that title to such public records can
ever be alienated, and hence they cannot be sold by an individual or dealer
with any guarantee of title.
This view raises legal questions which, as far as I know,
have not been answered. For example, how do you make a
legal distinction between the state not being able to
abandon manuscripts yet being able to abandon, or sell, or
otherwise dispose of most any other form of chattel that
it owns? Does pot the attitude that there never can be an
alienation of state manuscripts partake of royal prerogative? How do you make a modern viewpoint retroactive?
Considerable cloudiness exists as to what constitutes public archival property in the first place.
Part of the problem has to do with manuscripts that were
never in the possession of a government but which might,
nevertheless, be claimed by it. The attempt of the federal government to assert ownership of certain memorabilia
from the Lewis and Clark expedition, which was financed by
the government, comes to mind. In that case, the claim of
the government for documents which had never been in the
possession of the government, was defeated. I am also
thinking of an example out of my own recent experience.
We bought some manuscripts from a person in North Carolina
whose ancestor had been an adjutant general in the Confederate Army. A nationally known manuscript expert had
appraised the collection and rendered his opinion as to
the Confederate manuscripts as follows: "Since these are
official records, this volume is legally the property of
the Federal Government, to whom it should be returned, and
no evaluation is assigned." That opinion is all the more
remarkable because these papers had been in the house from
which we got them since 1865. The state of Georgia has
had its own experience with this phenomenon. Some few
years ago your legislature authorized the Secretary of
State to spend as much as $20,000 to obtain from the federal government the records of Confederate soldiers from
Georgia. These materials were probably a part of the so-
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called "Rebel Archives," spoils of war brought to Washington at the close of the Civil War and thereafter,
miraculously, federal property.
Somewhat similarly, the federal government in
the First and Second World Wars took control of a variety
of alien property in this country. At one time the Alien
Property Custodian had well over 50,000 cubic feet of manuscripts. The disposition, still incomplete, went in every
possible direction from destruction, to retention, to return to the former owners. There is still no understood
policy in determining the custody and disposition of enemy
records. Most of that answer probably needs to come from
international treaties.
Having said this much on the question of ownership of public and private records, let us turn now to the
problem of use. Hopefully the law relating to the use of
manuscripts can be explained without all the exceptions
which I was required to make in talking about ownership.
Public records, with small exceptions most involving confidentiality, may be quoted and published. Private records, where they are donated to or bought by an institution, similarly may be used but only to the extent
that the donor or seller could himself have used them. By
this I mean that the scholar may publish in full those
writings of the donor or seller because, obviously, any
author may publish that which he wrote. But the typical
manuscript collection will consist heavily of letters
written to the donor or seller. It is with these materials
that we hit a snag, called the common law of literary property rights which is still preventative, or pre-publication
if you like, in its operation.
In 1890 in the Harvard Law Review, a remarkably
foresighted article entitled "The Right to Privacy," by
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis examined the nature of
this incorporeal right and concluded that it rested more
on the right to privacy than on property rights:
The same protection is accorded to a
casual letter or an entry in a diary
as to the most valuable poem or essay,
to a botch or daub or to a masterpiece.
In every case the individual is entitled
to decide whether that which is his
shall be given to the public. No other
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has the right to publish his productions in any form, without his
consent.
This personal property right, unless alienated, abandoned,
or breached, exists in the heirs of the author unto perpetuity.
This coDll!lon law of literary property rights is
more flagrantly violated by scholars and by governments
than any other law that I can think of. And it is violated knowingly with a "don't give a damn" attitude in
the sacred name of scholarship. Under federal auspices
the National Historical Publications CoDllllission proposes
to film "virtually all documentar)[ sources of national
significance for all but the most recent period (material
dated after 1920), regardless of where this material is
located in the United States." That statement was made
by Dr. Wayne Grover, former Archivist of the United States,
in an article in the March 1966 issue of the Journal of
American History. From what I have seen, the program
makes no distinction between what can legally be filmed
and what cannot legally be filmed. Nor have I seen any
recognition by the National Historical Publications
CoDll!lission that a problem ex ists, let alone any expression
of concern. It would be nice if the Connnission would request a ruling from the Attorney General, but my impression
is that the gentlemen involved with the program really
don't want to know if they are in error.
The individual scholar also violates literary
property rights when he quotes and publishes manuscripts
which, at best, should only be sutmnarized. Bear in mind
the scholar has the right to read the protected letter
and to tell all about it. He can publish the fact that
this author wrote the specific person on the particular
date a two page typewritten letter in which the writer
admitted taking the money, how much, from whom, in what
denominations, and what he did with it. All the scholar
can't do is directly quote the letter in broadcasting
these details.
That's enough. I think scholars cry too much
when they say the law of literary property rights cripples
research. I also see the scholar's transgressions as less
significant than those of the federal government, not because the scholar is necessarily more ignorant, but because his total activity lacks the scope and purpose to
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violate the rights of others that so obviously exists in
the federal program. Filming can't sunnnarize or pick
significant facts; it can only totally and mindlessly
ignore the law.
Parenthetically let me say that today the federal
government is the defendant in a suit brought by the
scientific publisher, Williams and Wilkins Company, for
copyright violations. The Court of Claims has ruled for
the plaintiff and the case is on appeal. At issue is
the publication of some 80,000 copyrighted items per year
by the National Library of Medicine and its affiliated
agencies without a nickel of royalty being paid. The
publisher doesn't want to prevent the copying but he does
want royalty payments for it.
Thus we see an important difference between
copyright and literary property rights. Copyright provides a means of payment in an understood and accepted
conunercial situation. Redress against the violator of
the copyright law lies simply in forcing him to make
adequate payment. On the other hand the author of the
unpublished manuscript has had his privacy breached by
unauthorized publication and money does not make amends
in the same way. The privacy is gone forever, with
whatever unwanted results that might have accompanied
it. I have no doubt that the law of literary property
rights should be limited in duration by statute. No
personal right should exist in perpetuity. But it
should remain clearly a right of privacy, not to be confused with copyright in any way. Meantime we should
cease our arrogant and willful violation of both laws.
As a librarian I must throw our name into this pot. Not
a day goes by that we don't aid and abet these violations
by furnishing our personal services and our institutional
equipment for copying that invades privacy as to manuscripts and goes beyond any possible concept of fair use
for copyrighted material.
To all the lousy reasons that we hear these
days for breaking the law, let us not add the excuse
that we too, in the name of enlightenment, are above it
all.
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